The Federal Reserve Bank has the ability to change the money supply and to shape the expectations of market participants through their open market operations. These operations may amount to 20% of the day's volume and are concentrated during the half hour known as`Fed Time.' Using previously unavailable data on open market operations from 1982 to 1988, our paper provides the¯rst comprehensive examination of the impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's trading on both¯xed income instruments and foreign currencies. Our results detail a dramatic increase in volatility during Fed Time, consistent with market expectations of Fed intervention during this time interval. Wē nd that there is little systematic di®erence in market impact between reserve-draining and reserve-adding operations. Additionally, Fed Time volatility is, on average, higher on days when open market operations are absent. These results suggest that the markets are potentially confused about the purpose of the open market operations during our sample period. The evidence is also consistent with the Fed operations conveying information which smooths market participants' expectations.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's open market operations on the financial markets. These operations typically involve the purchase or sale of Treasury securities and can represent a substantial amount of any day's trading volume. Using new daily data on the operations, we are able to assess the impact on eight different financial markets: Treasury bill, Eurodollar, Treasury bond, and five U.S. dollar exchange rates.
The Federal Reserve Bank can be viewed as a trader with private information.
This information is revealed to the market in many different ways: remarks by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, testimony before the House and Senate Banking Committees, the release of the Beige book, the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, changes in reserve requirements, changes in the discount rate, and open market operations. The last method is, by far, the primary and most actively employed policy tool of the Federal Reserve Bank in implementing its monetary policy. Therefore, our analysis provides a rare opportunity to study the effects of private information trading. Data on private trades are often unavailable and the identity of the informed traders is seldom known. In contrast, we are able to identify a major market participant with private information. We know the time interval of the day when this participant trades. We know the volume and the type of trade. With this information, we are in a position to assess the impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's operations on a number of important markets.
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Our study contributes to the literature on the impact of Federal Reserve's monetary policy. Specifically, our sample period is nestled between two policy changes. Between 1979 and 1982 , the Fed policy is to target monetary aggregates.
During our sample period from 1982 to 1988, the policy target is a mixture of borrowed reserves and federal funds rates. During this period, the Fed is highly secretive about the policy making process as well as its actual policy. It believes 1 Formal models of market microstructure with privately informed traders are provided by Kyle (1985) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Foster and Viswanathan (1990) , and others. 1 that the release of such information is detrimental to the attainment of its monetary targets. It would not make public announcement of policy changes nor acknowledge its choice of policy targets. Moreover, it would frequently make policy adjustments between the regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. Beginning in December 1989, the Fed converted fully to federal funds targeting and began releasing information about its targets. This culminates with a new policy in 1994 to immediately announce changes in the federal funds rate, thereby removing the veil of secrecy surrounding monetary policy.
We examine a period in time when the Fed makes a conscious effort to hide its true intentions from the market. As such, we expect the market reaction to open market operations to be more pronounced than the period after 1989 when the Fed begins publishing information on policy targets. We expect policy changes after 1994, when the Fed begins making immediate announcements of policy targets, to be even more evident and predictable. Urich and Wachtel (2000) find that with the implementation of the new policy in 1994, the impact of policy changes on short-term interest rates have declined.
Our study also contributes to the literature on what moves financial asset prices and the process by which new information is incorporated into the prices.
This literature considers the impact of private and public information on asset prices. However, research on macroeconomic news invariably focuses on public information. For example Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998) document that information revealed by announcements of producer price index and employment data have immediate effects on bond market volatility. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (1999) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) investigate the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on the U.S. Treasury market using the GovPX transactions data. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green examine 26 economic news announcements while Fleming and Remolona study announcements of consumer and producer price indices and employment data. Almost all the announcements generate significantly higher bond volatility. Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Ederington and Lee (2000) examine intraday volatility induced by public announcements, volatility persistence, and calendar effects. Andersen and Bollerslev address the deutsche mark-dollar volatility and Ederington and Lee consider interest rate and foreign exchange markets. Their results show that of the three effects, the release of economic news is the most important during high volatility periods.
In contrast to the public macroeconomic news literature, we examine the reaction of asset prices to private macroeconomic information. This is made possible by the availability of historical data on securities that are traded in the course of open market operations during Fed Time.
Our analysis reveals that the Federal Reserve Bank's open market operations result in dramatic increases in volatility during the trading-time window, 11:30am-12:00 EST, known as 'Fed Time'. This is consistent with the market expecting some type of Fed intervention during this time interval. However, there is some evidence of higher volatilities on days when there are no open market operations.
We also examine the effects on the returns and the volatilities of specific operations that are designed to increase or decrease money supply. Contrary to expectations, the effects on returns of reserve-adding and reserve-draining operations cannot be reliably differentiated from one another. These results suggest that the market is unable to decode the Fed policy targets from the Fed participation in the market. to those trying to understand the role of the Fed in the country's economic strategy, the specific actions available to the Fed as well as the impact of these actions.
One would expect open market operations to be more informative when they are not pre-announced. Our sample period predates the pre-announcement policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe the mechanisms through which the Federal Reserve Bank's open market operations affect financial markets. In this section, we detail the type of open market operations that are available to the Federal Reserve Bank and the expected effect of each operation. The data sources and the econometric methodology are outlined in the third section. In the fourth section, the results are presented.
Some concluding remarks are offered in the final section.
The Federal Reserve Bank's open market operations

Policy and implementation
Much has been written about the role of the Federal Reserve Bank in the economy. By exercising some control over the money supply, most believe that the Federal Reserve Bank has the ability to influence financial prices, in particular, the short-term interest rates. This paper aims to provide direct evidence on the impact of open market operations on financial markets.
Before examining the specific actions that the Federal Reserve Bank takes, we first describe how policies are translated into actions.
2 At the highest level, the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 mandates that the Federal
Reserve Bank set annual growth targets for monetary aggregates and justify these targets with respect to economic activity, inflation policy and employment outlook.
As a result of this act, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank appears before the House and Senate Banking committees twice a year to explain the Federal
Reserve Bank Policy (known as the Humphrey-Hawkins hearings).
Of course, the testimony of the Chairman is based on policy and activities that has been preformulated. The body in charge of policy is the FOMC. This committee meets about eight times a year and consists of the presidents of the 2 Our discussion draws from the detailed reviews of the Federal Reserve Bank provided by Broaddus (1988) and especially by Meulendyke (1989 The supply of reserves has two categories: borrowed reserves (BR) and nonborrowed reserves (NBR). There are three types of BR which are available to banks through the Fed's discount window: adjustment credit, seasonal credit, and extended credit borrowing. The first two are reasonably common and the last category is only used if the bank is in trouble. More importantly, banks must try to obtain reserves from other means, such as the federal funds market, before using the discount window.
Nonborrowed reserves are obtained from sources that exclude the discount window. During the 1979-1982 regime, the Federal Reserve Bank attempted to control NBR in order to achieve their objectives for the growth in aggregates.
Given an NBR target, a change in demand for reserves by banks had to be accommodated at the discount window. This borrowing heavily influenced the market for federal funds and produced large fluctuations in short-term interest rates. Since Before detailing the specific operations, consider an example of how policy is implemented. Suppose the FOMC, concerned with heightened inflation, elects to increase reserve "pressure." The appropriate action is to drain reserves. An example of a draining operation is the New York desk selling Treasury securities.
The immediate impact is the loss of reserves in the purchasers' banks. As the purchasers' banks try to make up the deficiency, all banks are affected. The purchasers' banks have a number of options: they could reduce transactions deposits (which would serve the policy objective but is difficult to implement in the short run), they could reduce their excess reserves (but they may not have any), or they could go to the federal funds market (which would bid up the federal funds rate).
For the banking industry as a whole, going to the federal funds market would merely redistribute the shortage. In fact, borrowing reserves at the discount window may be the only possibility. This process leads to a gradual decline in the money growth.
Instruments of open-market operations
Open market operations involve the purchase or sale of Treasury securities. Sales drain reserves (increase reserve pressure) and purchases add to reserves (decrease reserve pressure). The trades can be permanent or temporary. The fifth step is execution. After the meeting is over (usually between 11:30am and 11:40am), the desk traders immediately contact the primary dealers and execute the day's program.
Data and methodology
Data
Historical data Although we know the time interval and the day specific open market operations occurred, we do not know the precise time when a specific security is bought or sold. Earlier studies have shown that the reaction time to a public announcement is immediate. For example Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998) find that announcement-day bond volatility induced by news of producer price index and employment statistics does not persist at all and prices reflect public information quickly. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (1999) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) document that U.S. government bond prices react to news in the major macroecoworksheets and the hardcopies and, as a result, did not use the worksheets.
nomic announcements almost instantaneously. Therefore, we have not examined asset price reaction to specific trades but instead focus on the reaction of asset prices during Fed Time.
Methodology
This paper uses transaction prices from the futures markets to study the impact of open market operations. The returns are the natural logarithm of the current price divided by the previous price. We estimate the volatility of hourly returns but focus on intrahour volatility using two-minute returns. This is because the variance of hourly returns may not pick up the volatility that occurs within the hour since only two points are used to calculate the hourly return and frequent information arrival may occur within the hour. We calculate the volatility of twominute returns for four half-hour intervals: 10:00am-10:30am, 10:30am-11:00am, 11:00am-11:30am, and 11:30am-12:00pm (Fed Time). We also average the daily variances during Fed Time to obtain annual estimates.
We use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of variances to test whether variances are elevated during the Fed Time interval. The model estimated is:
where r t represents a vector of returns over, for example, four half-hour intervals, µ is a vector of mean returns over the time intervals, σ 2 is a vector of variances, and u t and e t are the disturbance terms.
With four time intervals, there are eight equations in (1) and eight parameters. These parameters could be estimated with maximum likelihood. However, the standard errors would not be robust to conditional heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we use Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) to obtain heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the variances and to conduct hypothesis tests on the parameters. The model is exactly identified when we condition on a vector of ones. One advantage of Hansen's approach is that only weak 11 distributional assumptions are required.
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With the GMM methodology, it is straightforward to test the hypothesis that variances are different during a particular time period. For example, variance equality can be tested with:
where σ 2 is a singleton parameter and ι is a 1 × 4 vector of ones. This system is overidentified resulting in a χ 2 test with three degrees of freedom. Alternatively, Wald tests of parameter restrictions can be carried out on (1).
We also test for the effects of the open market operations on both the returns and the volatilities. This analysis is specialized to the Fed Time half-hour interval, denoted with the F T subscript. The following model is estimated:
where j represents the type of operation (outright purchase, outright sale, (3) because the indicator variables sum to unity.
The formulation in (3) allows for both the mean and the variance processes to vary by year and by operation. Furthermore, it is straightforward to conduct hypothesis tests on the parameters of interest. However, in practical terms, (3) may require a lot of data. With seven years of daily data and up to 15 observations per day, the estimation involves up to 20,000 observations with parameters for means and variances by year. Often, we specialize the estimation to examine one particular year or one particular operation.
We use (3) in a number of different ways. We estimate variances on the days when particular operations are initiated. We test whether variances during Fed operations are equal to variances on days with no operations. We also test whether returns on days when there are draining operations are equal to returns on days with adding operations.
Using indicator variables does not capture the effect of the magnitude of the operation. However, the magnitude of the operation is problematic for a number of reasons: the amount of reserves has grown through time, and more importantly, we do not know how much of the operation is unexpected.
The first problem is reasonably easy to solve. By looking at the data by year, we solve, to some extent, the problem of the size of the operations growing through time. Alternatively, since we have data on total reserves, the operations can be deflated by the total reserves to give a measure of relative size. The interhour patterns in the volatility of these two instruments are presented in Panels A and B of Figure 1 .
Results
Interhour volatility
The opening hour return volatility is the highest of the day. This heightened volatility has been traced to the concentration of economic news announcements during this hour [Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) , Harvey and Huang (1991, 1993) , Ederington and Lee (1993, 2000) , and Becker, Finnerty and Kopecky (1993) 
Intrahour volatility
The preceding section presents estimates based on hourly prices. However, an hourly return of zero may mask substantial fluctuation of prices during the hour.
In this section, we report variances of two-minute returns to capture intrahour price movements. The results are reported in Table 2 . The variances are calculated over half-hour periods and the analysis is concentrated on the time interval 10:00-12:00. The sample period for the two-minute results is October 6, 1982 to May 10, 1988 and, hence, 1982 and 1988 contain less than a full year of data.
Inferences based on the statistics in Table 2 are consistent with those based on 
Open market operations: returns and volatility
This section examines the impact of the specific open market operations.
Some summary statistics on the open market operations are presented in Table 3 .
Five operations are presented: MSPs, outright sales, outright purchases, system
RPs, and customer RPs. Data on foreign purchases and sales are also available but are not included as they tend to be small and are unlikely to impact the financial markets. The last three rows of each panel in Table 4 "Desk officers also take market conditions into account in choosing the day to arrange an outright operation. They try to avoid conducting operations in rapidly rising or falling markets, not wishing either to add to market volatility or to impede price adjustment."
While it is clear that volatility is lower when the Fed is conducting operations, it is important to remember that Fed Time has already elevated market volatility above the adjacent time periods.
An issue that arises is whether our results are due to the day-of-the-week effect. Perhaps the higher volatility on days when the Fed does not take action is due to something other than Fed's action or inaction. In particular, it has often been observed that market volatility is higher on Fridays. Evidence from earlier research is inconsistent with this possibility because the higher volatility Outright purchases and system RPs add to reserves and should increase market prices. Customer RPs also add to reserves but given that they are smaller than the system RPs, we exclude them from the addition category. 9 However, these predictions may fail to materialize if the market participants are unable to discern the Fed' policy targets.
The results show that for both fixed income and currency futures contracts, 8 The results for the impact of individual operations on returns are available from the authors on request.
9 When the Fed purchase U.S. government securities for a customer, such as a foreign central bank, the primary dealers do not know who the customer is. The primary dealers also do not know with any certainty that the trade is for a customer and not for the Fed's own account. Indeed, even settlement of the trade is masked so that the exact counterparty cannot be determined. the estimated returns often have the wrong signs. For example, negative returns are observed for every year in the sample for Treasury bonds for reserve-adding operations contrary to prediction. More interestingly, Table 5 also reports tests of return equality for reserve-adding and reserve-draining operations. For every financial market that we examine, the test results show that the impact on returns of reserve-adding operations cannot be distinguished reliably from reserve-draining operations. Multivariate tests of whether the year-by-year means are the same for draining and adding operations combining all seven years of data also fail to reject the null hypothesis for all contracts. Thus, it appears that over our sam- The evidence in Table 5 is consistent with market participants' inability to identify the purpose of the open market operations. This would account for the inability of our tests to distinguish the impact on the financial contract's returns of reserve-adding versus reserve-draining operations. However, there appears to be an asymmetric effect on volatility. It is possible that adding operations signal some fundamental information about weakness in the economy which translates into market volatility.
Conclusions
The Federal Reserve Bank is a unique trader whose actions reveal information about monetary policy. The trading is concentrated during the half hour known as Fed Time. We find that market volatility is dramatically higher during this half hour than surrounding times. However, this increased volatility is independent of whether the Fed actually trades in the market. In fact, there is some evidence that volatility is lower during Fed Time when the Fed trades than when it does not trade.
We also examine how the market differentiates between reserve-adding and Intrahour volatility of¯nancial futures contracts
Variances of the two-minute relative price changes for the Treasury bill, Eurodollar and Treasury bond are multiplied by 10,000,000. We exclude the observations for October 20, 1987 in the variance calculation. The data are from January 2, 1982{May 10, 1988. Table 1 Interhour volatility in financial futures contracts
The model estimated is:
where r t is the vector of returns over six hourly time intervals, µ is the vector of mean estimates, σ 2 is the vector of variance estimates, and u is the vector of the disturbances with unconditional zero means. The system is exactly identified. Parameters are obtained by estimating both year by year and by a pooled estimation using the full sample. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The data are from January 2, 1982-May 10, 1988. The variances are those of the relative price changes calculated as (p t /p t−1 ) − 1 and are multiplied by 10,000,000. The nearby contract is used until two weeks before expiration when we switch to the next-out contract. Beginning October 18, 1984 the Treasury bill opening was moved back from 8:00 CT to 7:30 CT. On October 15, 1985, both the Eurodollar and Treasury bill openings were moved back to 7:20 CT. The variances for the Eurodollar, Treasury bill and Treasury bond are estimated without the October 20, 1987 observation. Table 2 Intrahour
volatility near Fed Time in financial markets
where r t is a 1 × 4 vector of 2-minute returns at time t over the four half-hour intervals, µ are the means, σ are the variances, and u t , e t are the disturbances. This system is exactly identified and is estimates by year. The hypothesis that the variance during Fed time is equal to the variance during one of the other half-hour periods is conducted with a Wald test. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is October 6, 1982 to May 10, 1988. The variances are those of the relative price changes calculated as`n(p t /p t−1 ) and are multiplied by 10,000,000. The nearby contract is used until two weeks before expiration when we switch to the next-out contract. Table 4 The effect of open market operations on volatility based on 2 minute returns during Fed Time
where j represents the type of operation (outright purchase, outright sale, matched-sale purchase, system repo, customer repo, and no operation), y represents the year, I OMO is an indicator variable for the open market operations. In this formulation, r F T,t is a 15 × 1 vector of two minute returns in Fed Time for time period t. u F T,t and e F T,t are the disturbance terms associated with the mean and variance equations. The parameters µ and ν are estimates of the means and variances by operation and by year. There is no intercept because the intercepts sum to unity. The system is exactly identiÞed. For most of the results, the system is estimated year by year. For the test of whether the variance is different on days with operations versus days without operations, the system is estimated with two mean and two variance parameters. A Wald test is conducted on the variance parameters. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is October 6, 1982 to May 10, 1988. The variances are those of the relative price changes calculated as`n(p t /p t−1 ) and are multiplied by 10,000,000. The nearby contract is used until two weeks before expiration when we switch to the next-out contract. Table 5 The effect of reserve adding and draining operations on returns and volatility
The model estimated is: where i represents the purpose of the operation: Addition (outright purchase, system repo); Drain (outright sale, matched salepurchase); No action. Customer repos are also an addition operation, however, they are less likely to be viewed as linked to policy and we do not include them in the addition category. y represents the year and the indicator I F LOW y,i
takes on a value of one during year y and for operation purpose i. In this formulation, r F T,t is up to a 15 × 1 vector of two minute returns in Fed Time for time period t. u F T,t and e F T,t are the disturbance terms associated with the mean and variance equations. The parameters µ and ν are estimates of the means and variances by purpose of operation and by year. There is no intercept because the intercepts sum to unity. The system is exactly identified. For most of the results, the system is estimated year by year. A Wald test is conducted to test the equality of variances and means. The parameters for days with no operations are not reported. If there is a day with both an adding and draining operation, the day is omitted from the sample. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is October 6, 1982 to May 10, 1988. 
